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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Misty M. Buhler, appellant herein, appeals from judgment and sentence against 
her for Operating a Possession of Methamphetamine, Felony, LC. 37-2732(c)(1), 
pursuant to her Judgment of Conviction thereon. (R. 118-122). 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Appellant Misty M. Buhler was charged Possession of Metharnphetamlne, 
Felony, I.C. 37-2732(c)(1) by way of Complaint filed July 1, 2010. (R. 13-14). 
Ms. Buhler filed a Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support on August 
13, 2010, along with a supporting affidavit. (R 39-54). The District Court, the 
Honorable Randy Stoker presiding, held argument on the motion on September 10, 
2007. {R. 55). 
The record before the Court reflected that Ms. Buhler was seated in a vehicle, 
which was parked in a parking lot, open to the public, between two stores located at a 
mall in Twin Falls, Idaho. (R. 49-50). (Tr. 9-17-08, Pg. 17, Lines 4-21). Police officers 
parked their vehicles directly behind her vehicle and two other vehicles preventing them 
from leaving the scene. (R. 49). When the officers arrived, Ms. Buhler was seated in 
the rear passenger seat of one of the other vehicles. (R. 49). Shortly after arrival, the 
officers pulled Ms. Buhler out of her vehicle, frisked her, and handcuffed her, during 
which time she was not allowed to check on her minor daughter w'.10 was in the 
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daughter's car seat in Ms. Buhler's vehicle, and during which time she was questioned 
regarding drugs without the benefit of Miranda rights. (R. 69). She was not read her 
rights until after the search of her vehicle, which search she objected t•:) when asked. 
(R. 50). 
In a memorandum opinion dated September 29, 2010, the district court denied 
Ms. Buhler's Motion to Suppress as far as the physical evidence that was recovered, 
but granted the motion with regard to statements obtained from Ms. Buhler after 
handcuffing but before her rights were read to her. (R. 61-71). As stated above, Ms. 
Buhler subsequently entered her plea, upon which the Court sentenced her. (R. 118-
122). Ms. Buhler timely filed her appeal. (R. 127-130). 
11. 
ISSUE 
A. Did the District Court err by denying the Appellant's Motion to Suppress 
Evidence? 
111. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court erred by denying the Appellant's Motion to Suppress 
Evidence. 
The Defendant has the initial burden of proof to make a prima facie showing of 
Illegality. See, e.g., United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. Cal. 1974), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 1120, 95 S.Ct. 802, 42 L.Ed.2d 820 (1975); United Sta;c;,9_v. Cella, 568 
? 
F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. Cal. 1977). Once the Defendant makes this showing, the burden 
shifts to the government to show the existence of some justification of the presumptively 
illei:ial search and seizure. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 
LEd.2d 441 (1963). 
It is important to further repeat that the stopping of a vehicle is a seizure of its 
occupants and is subject to Fourth Amendment safeguards. State v. Gutierrez, 137 
Idaho 550, 552-53, 961 P.2d 641 (2002).; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 
873, 878 (1975). Such a seizure is conceded by the State in this case due to the 
blocking of the three vehicles by the officer's patrol units. 
A seizure continues when an officer restrains an individual so thRt i::-onsidering all 
the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would communicate to 
a reasonable person that she is not at liberty to go about her business. State v. 
Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 550, 552-53, 961 P.2d 641 (2002) 
The police may not unreasonably extend a detention and search a vehicle on 
once the purpose of the stop is complete, even momentarily, absent reasonable, 
objective grounds to do so. State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 650, 651-52, 961 P.2d 641 
(2002). 
The state relies on the "totality of the circumstances" test, and attempts to boot 
strap factors that bear on another occupant of the vehicle, along with the alarm that had 
gone off in the area, to justify the detention of Ms. Buhler and the search of her vehicle. 
The state also contends that Ms. Buhler is mis-applying Miranda v. Arize,t1a, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966) concepts to a search and seizure situation. Such is not the case. Rather, Ms. 
Buhler contends that the state illegally detained Ms. Buhler, then though Ms. Buhler 
contends she was not comfortable with a search of her car, relies on a purported 
consent to a search. When one looks at the overall situation, including the illegal 
questioning of Ms. Buhler, any alleged consent is tainted by the illegality, and also was 
not voluntary as required by law. 
First, regarding detention, as stated in Ms. Buhler's opening brief, there was 
virtually no testimony of any sort of independent factors constituting probable cause or 
even reasonable suspicion regarding Ms. Buhler. The only testimony rsgarding Ms. 
Buhler is that the officer's found it odd that she was in the back seat of the vehicle rather 
than the front. Incredibly, the state takes the position that that the fact that Ms. Buhler 
waG in the back seat and that Mr. Wilson was fidgety meant that Ms. Buhler was 
involved in drug activity without other objective, independent evidence. The totality of 
the circumstances test does not allow for the police to act against a passenger due to 
the acts of another passenger or driver. Also, the concerns regarding the store alarms 
had nothing to do with the subjective suspicions of the police regarding Ms. Buhler. The 
alarms cannot be part of a "totality of the circumstances" that led to an illegal detention, 
illegal questioning, and ultimately the extraction of a "consent" to search from Ms. 
Buhler. 
Moreover, the extended handcuffing and detention of Ms. Buhler, while she was 
being questioned about drugs without the benefit of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966), makes her continued detention an illegal extension of the initial stop 
in this case, thus making the search of her vehicle and recovery of evidence 
unreasonable and illegal. In additions, subsequent illegal police activity was found by 
the district court, {R., pp. 66, 69}. 
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Ms. Buhler was pulled from Mr. Wilson's car, handcuffed and detained, denied 
access to her vehicle and daughter, and interrogated about drugs as the vehicles were 
searched. (R. 50, 63). Notably, nothing incriminating was found on Ms. Buhler's person 
when she was patted down. (R. 63). She denied anything illegal in her car. (R. 63). Mr. 
Wilson claimed ownership of everything found in his car. (Tr., 9/10/10, p. 62, lines 14-
16). 
Then while Ms. Buhler was being detained, denied access to her vehicle and 
sleeping child, handcuffed and ordered to sit on the bumper of the police cruiser and 
unlawfully interrogated about possession of drugs, the officers indicated they obtained 
consent to search. (Tr., 9/10/10, p. 31, lines 5-6). The district court noted that Ms. 
Buhler testified she was not comfortable with a search but that she did not expressly 
refuse to allow a search of her car. (R. 63, Tr. 9/10/10, p. 88, lines 4 - 17). Such is not 
the standard. As argued below, the state must prove that consent was voluntary and 
freely given and not tainted by prior illegal police activity. State v. ThO-'J"e, 141 Idaho 
151, 153, 106 P.3d 477 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Zapata-Reyes, 144 Idaho 703, 709, 
169 P.3d 291 (Ct. App. 2007). The standard is not that the defendant did not expressly 
refuse the search. Any conclusion by the district court to the contrary is in error. 
Ms. Buhler further submits that her detention and subsequent search was not a 
reasonable extension of the original grounds for contact, and that no objective, 
reasonable grounds testified to by the officer or in evidence before the District Court 
justified the additional detention and search that led to her alleged consent, and the 
discovery of the evidence herein. As stated above, any consent to search that was 
obtained by the officers for the search of her car was tainted by the prior unreasonable 
contact of the officers, and the failure to give Miranda rights that the district court found 
occurred. The entire chain of events from the illegal frisk, detention on t'1e hood of the 
patrol vehicle, and illegal questioning was "irrevocably intertwined" with the alleged 
consent, such that the alleged consent is tainted, and additionally cannot be found to be 
voluntarily given under the circumstances. Zapata-Reyes, 144 Idaho at 709. 
Ms. Buhler does not argue that the Miranda violation by itself results in 
suppression of the evidence from the search of her vehicle. Rather, she argues that it is 
one of the factors for the court to consider when looking at the voluntariness and also of 
the alleged consent given to the police to search her vehicle, and also constitutes part 
of the chain of events tainted by the illegal police activity.. Because the officers had 
previously illegally detained her, then were in the process of violating her Miranda 
rights, and because of the unreasonable detention of Ms. Buhler during interrogation, 
the alleged consent obtained was not voluntary, and the consent was ta::-;ted. This was 
due to the illegal frisk and improperly extended detention not based on independent and 
reasonable cause, and was therefore not valid to support the search of Ms. Buhler's 
vehicle. Thorpe, 141 Idaho at 153. 
Again regarding consent, in Idaho, if consent to search is given during the course 
of an illegal detention of an individual, the consent is irrevocably intertwined with illegal 
police conduct, and is therefore invalid. Zapata-Reyes, 144 Idaho at 709. Therefore, 
the fruits of the search in this case should have been suppressed. 
The district court erred by relying in its opinion upon Maryland v. Wilson, 519 
U.S. 408,415 (1997} for the proposition that Ms. Buhler was properly ordered from the 
car and that her continued detention was not unreasonable. However in th\s case, once 
she was ordered from the car, she was additionally handcuffed and interrogated with 
regard to drugs, without Miranda warnings. Unlike Maryland v. Wilson, in this case, 
drugs did not fall from her person as she was pulled from the car, nor were drugs or 
anything illegal discovered during her pat down search. 
On the contrary, in this case, the district court found that the police conducted an 
illegal pat down of Ms. Buhler as there was no objective evidence that Ms. Buhler was 
armed or dangerous. (R. 66). Yet the police continued with her detention, and she was 
ordered to sit on the patrol car in handcuffs and questioned. The district court further 
found that questioning to be illegal. (R. 68). Therefore, the district court found two 
examples of illegal police conduct prior to the alleged consent being given. 
Yet, the district court went on to find that the consent was valid because the 
police had found drugs in Mr. Wilson's car and because the exchan2,2 i)etween the 
officers and Ms. Buhler was not hostile during the time she was handcuffed and placed 
against the hood of a car without access to her child. Ms. Buhler argues such 
cor-clusion is in error. First, she testified that she objected to the search and said she 
was not comfortable with it. 
Further, Ms. Buhler submits that given her situation, to the extent she gave any 
reluctant consent, she was coerced and intimidated in to giving the consent she was 
alleged to have given. Again, the state must prove that consent was voluntary and 
freely given and said consent must not tainted by prior illegal police activity. State v. 
Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151, 153, 106 P.3d 477 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Zapata~Reyes, 144 
Idaho 703, 709, 169 P.3d 291 (Ct. App. 2007). 
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Whether the connection between the illegal police conduct and the discovery of 
evidence is sufficiently attenuated to allow the use of the evidence is considered under 
three factors: (1) the elapsed time between the illegal conduct and acquisition of the 
evidence; (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the flagrancy and 
purpose of the improper law enforcement action. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846-47, 
103 P.3d 454 (2004). 
In this case, contrary to the district court's conclusions, there were no intervening 
factors or circumstances related to Ms. Buhler to attenuate the taint c•i tt1e illegal pat 
down and questioning. The only additional circumstance was the discovery of drugs in 
Mr. Wilson's car, over which Mr. Wilson claimed ownership. There was no independent, 
intervening circumstance that would attenuate the effects of the illegal pat down, much 
less the questioning that was occurring while Ms. Buhler was handcuffed and being 
forced to sit on the hood of the patrol vehicle. The timing of the search was within 20 or 
30 minutes of the illegal pat down. The bulk of the questioning, including the purported 
consent, occurred while Ms. Buhler was cuffed and seated on the front of the patrol 
vehicle while being questioned illegally without the benefit of Miranda rights. (R 69). 
Any consent that was obtained was not voluntarily and freely given the above 
facts in the evidence before the district court and the findings made by :.he court. And 
even if consent was obtained, the consent was irrevocably intertwined and tainted by 
the prior illegal police conduct. Therefore the evidence obtained from the resulting 
search of Ms. Buhler's vehicle should have been suppressed. 
Under these facts, the trial court should be reversed, the conviction overturned 
and the matter remanded for further proceedings. 
A 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Buhler respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of 
her motion to suppress, that her conviction also be reversed, and the matter remanded 
for further proceedings, 
DATED this 24th day of July, 2012. 
STE HEN D. THOMPSON 
Appellate Public Defender 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of July, 2011, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF, by causing a copy thereof 
to be placed in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
SDT/ 
ST END. THOMPSON 
Appellate Public Defender 
10 
